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§ 16.1. Divorce Decrees - Survival of Separation Agreements.* Under 
Massachusetts law a husband and wife may, prior to their divorce, enter 
into a separation agreement that settles their rights and obligations, in-
cluding obligations to provide interspousal support.1 Such an agreement 
will survive entry of the judgment nisi of divorce if the parties so intend.2 
When an agreement survives, its terms cannot be altered by the probate 
court.3 With respect to interspousal support, the terms of the agreement 
should be specifically enforced if the probate court finds, at the time of 
entry of the judgment nisi, that the agreement was fair, reasonable, and 
free from fraud or coercion when entered into~ 
These principles indicate an attitude of judicial deference to the parties' 
resolution of their differences as contained in the separation agreement.5 
Such deference, however, has appeared in the case law only recently.6 
Massachusetts court opinions have traditionally reinforced the general 
principle that the parties cannot by their agreement deprive the probate 
court of the power to modify its own judgment. 7 With regard to child 
support, the probate court's discretion had been held to extend even 
t Sharon R. Chardak, Geoffrey E. Hobart, Tracy A. Miner, Madelyn Leopold. 
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§ 16.1. 1 Schillander v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 96, 98,29 N.E.2d 686,687 (1940); Bailey 
v. Dillon, 186 Mass. 244, 246, 71 N.E. 538, 539 (1904). 
2 Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 345, 285 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1972); Hills v. Shearer, 
355 Mass. 405, 408, 245 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1969); Fabrizio v. Fabrizio, 316 Mass. 343, 346, 55 
N.E.2d 604, 605 (1944). 
3 Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 656-57, 84 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1949). See generally 
Freedman, Marital Agreements, 18 BosTON BAR J. 5, 11 (September 1974). 
• See Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510,514, 432N.E.2d691, 694(1982); Knox v. Remick, 
371 Mass. 433, 436-37, 358 N.E.2d 432, 435 (1976). Under G.L. c. 215, § 6, as appearing in 
St. 1973, c.114, § 63, the probate court has jurisdiction to specifically enforce the separation 
agreement. 
5 See Inker, Perocchi, Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. Suav. MAss. LAW.§ 1.1, 
at 6. 
6 Id. 
7 Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 512, 432 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1982); Ryan v. Ryan, 371 
Mass. 430, 432, 358 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1976); Smith v. Smith, 358 Mass. 551, 553, 265 N.E.2d 
858, 859 (1971); Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 656-57, 84 N.E.2d 16, 19(1949); Wilson v. 
Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 302, 172 N.E. 251, 253 (1930). 
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further; the court is in no way restricted by the child support provisions of 
the parents' agreement.8 This tension between judicial deference and 
judicial discretion is exemplified in the fact that the probate court has the 
power to modify its own judgment, but cannot alter the terms of the 
agreement.9 Where oSUpport obligations of the parties are contained in 
both the judgment and the agreement and are inconsistent, the result has 
been frequent litigation .10 
During the Survey year, two cases arose that reinforced the significance 
of separation agreements in relation to divorce decrees. In Moore v. 
Moore, 11 the Supreme Judicial Court held that language in a divorce 
decree that the separation agreement shall not survive the decree does not 
operate to dissolve the agreement when the agreement expressly provides 
that it shall survive the decree.12 The Court thereby reinforced the policy 
of judicial deference to the intent of the parties where their agreement was 
fair, reasonable, and free from fraud and coercion in its adoption.13 In 
Randall v. Randall, 14 a case following Moore, the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court held that a probate judge erred in refusing specific enforcement of a 
valid surviving separation agreement that was fair, reasonable, and free 
from fraud and coercion in its adoption. 15 
8 2 J.P. LoMBARD, FAMILY LAw ,J 1258, at 317 (1967). See Madden v. Madden, 359 
Mass. 356, 363, 269 N.E.2d 89, 93, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Buchanan v. Bucha-
nan, 353 Mass. 351,352,231 N.E.2d 570, 571-72(1967); Dawson v. Rogers, 7Mass. App. Ct. 
351, 354, 387 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (1979); Reeves v. Reeves, 318 Mass. 381, 383-84, 61 N.E.2d 
654 (1945). 
9 See Freedman, supra note 3, at 11. 
1° For cases where the agreement is set up as a bar against a complaint for modification of 
the judgment in the probate court, see Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 432 N.E.2d 691 
(1982) (interspousal support); Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 285 N.E.2d 909 
(1972)(alimony); Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 287, 172 N.E. 251 (1930) (husband seeks 
modification of decree after former wife's remarriage); Schillander v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 
96, 29 N .E.2d 686 ( 1940) (husband denied petition for modification of provisions in contract 
not incorporated in decree); Bailey v. Dillon, 186 Mass. 244, 71 N.E. 538 (1904) (because 
agreement acts as bar to wife's petition for support, bill in equity to enjoin petition is 
demurrable). Such litigation has not been confined to setting up the agreement as a bar 
against modification of the judgment. For example, in Ryan v. Ryan, 371 Mass. 430, 358 
N.E.2d 431 (1976), the husband sought an injunction in superior court to bar the wife's 
petition for modification of the judgment in probate court. In Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 
652, 84 N.E.2d 16 (1949), the wife sued in superior court to enforce the agreement. 
The Supreme Judicial Court suggested putting an end to this proliferation of suits by 
resolving all aspects of the dispute in the Probate Court. Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 
438, 358 N.E.2d 434, 436 (1976). 
11 389 Mass. 21, 448 N.E.2d 1255 (1983). 
12 Id. at 21-22, 448 N.E.2d at 1256. 
13 Id. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
14 17 Mass. App. Ct. 24, 455 N.E.2d 995 (1983). 
15 Id. at 24-25, 455 N.E.2d at 996. During the Survey year a third case arose regarding 
separation agreements, Bell v. Bell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 188, 450 N.E.2d 650 (1983). It was 
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In Moore, the husband and wife married in 1951, and had two chil-
dren.16 On December 3, 1974, they entered into a separation agreement 
that provided for alimony and child support payments by the husband to 
the wife.17 One provision of the agreement stated that "notwithstanding 
the incorporation of this agreement in said decree, the provisions hereof 
shall not be merged . . . , but shall survive and be forever binding and 
conclusive on the wife and husband and their respective heirs, succes-
sors, and assigns." 18 The following day the probate court entered a 
judgment nisi of divorce.19 The judgment completely incorporated the 
provisions of the separation agreement, but stated further that the 
"agreement isJ_o be incorporated and merged into the probate decree and 
shall not surviVe as an independent agreement."20 
In March 1980, the wife filed a complaint in district court, alleging that 
the husband owed her approximately $8,725 pursuant to the separation 
agreement.21 The husband moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the language of the decree terminated the 
agreement.22 The district court denied the motion, and in September 1980 
judgment was entered for the wife~3 The appellate division summarily 
dismissed the report of the district court, and the husband appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court.24 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the summary dismissal, holding 
accepted for review by the Supreme Judicial Court. 390 Mass. 1101 (1983). In Bell the wife 
filed a contempt complaint in probate court for the husband's failure to make support 
payments due herunderajudgment of divorce. 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, 450N.E.2dat 651. 
The judgment incorporated the separation agreement, which the husband raised as a bar to 
the complaint. Under the separation agreement the parties specified that support payments 
to the wife would terminate upon her "living together with a member of the opposite sex, so 
as to give the outward appearance of marriage .... "I d. at 189-90, 450 N .E.2d at 651. The 
husband contended that the wife was living together with a member of the opposite sex, such 
that the obligation to make support payments had terminated. The probate court dismissed 
the wife's complaint. The appeals court reversed, finding that the separation agreement, 
read as a whole, indicated that support payments should terminate only when the wife's 
need for them terminated./d. at 194, 450N.E.2d at 653. One judge filed a dissent. I d. at 197. 





21 Id. Service of process on the husband under the long-arm statute, G.L. c. 223A, § 6 
suggests that the district court's jurisdiction was based on diversity. A default was entered 
on May 7, 1980, for the husband's failure to answer the March 1980 complaint. 389 Mass. at 
22-23, 448 N .E.2d at 1256. He specially appeared to remove the default three weeks later. I d. 
at 23, 448 N .E.2d at 1256. The judge allowed the motion on certain conditions. I d. 
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that the parties' separation agreement survived the divorce decree, de-
spite language in the decree to the contrary .25 In reaching the conclusion, 
the Supreme Judicial Court first reviewed the judicial policy in Massachu-
setts supporting separation agreements.26 According to the Court, the 
public policy of the Commonwealth favors the settlement of disputes 
resulting from a divorce through separation agreements fairly entered into 
by the parties.27 Once such an agreement is in effect, the Court stated, it 
may not be altered by the probate court.28 
The Court applied these principles to the question whether a separation 
agreement should survive the divorce decree where the separation agree-
ment expressly stated that its provisions should survive and be binding, 
notwithstanding the incorporation of the agreement into the decree.29 
According to the Court, the intent of the parties, not the inclination of the 
probate court, controls the question whether the separation agreement 
will survive.30 The Court, emphasizing its policy favoring survival of 
separation agreements, cited the general rule that unless the parties ex-
pressly provide otherwise, their agreement will be held to survive a 
subsequent judgment that incorporates by reference the terms of the 
agreement.31 
Turning to the facts of Moore, the Court found that the parties' ex-
pressed intent was that the agreement survive the decree.32 The Court 
held that this intent controlled.33 The probate court had no authority to 
prevent survival of the agreement, the Court concluded, absent a finding 
that the agreement was illegal, unfair, unreasonable, or the product of 
fraud or coercion.34 Therefore, pursuant to its equitable powers,35 the 
Court ordered that the decree be modified to state that the agreement "is 
to be incorporated and merged into the probate decree and shall survive 
as an independent agreement. " 36 
Four months after Moore was decided, the Appeals Court rejected a 
probate judge's modification of support provisions contained exclusively 
25 /d. at 25-26, 448 N.E.2d at 1258. 
26 /d. at 24, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
27 Id. 
28 /d. 
29 Id. at 25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
30 See id. at 24-25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
31 /d. at 25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257 (citing Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 345-46 n.4, 
285 N.E.2d 909, 911 n.4 (1972)). 
32 /d. at 25, 448 N.E.2d at 1257. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. 
35 G.L. c. 2ll, § 3. 
36 389 Mass. at 25-26, 448 N.E.2d at 1258. The Court ordered that the decree be modified 
by striking the word "not." /d. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/19
§ 16.1 DOM:ESTIC RELATIONS 485 
in a separation agreement that survived the judgment.37 In Randall, the 
husband and wife married in 1958, and had two children.38 On January 31, 
1976, they entered into a separation agreement in contemplation of di-
vorce.39 Under the agreement the husband was to make unallocated 
monthly payments for alimony and child support combined, in decreasing 
amounts, through November 1986 when the payments would terminate.411 
The agreement also provided for medical insurance, lump sums toward 
college tuition, and an even division of marital property (the marital 
residence) after the emancipation ofthe children.41 A judgment of divorce 
nisi was entered on February 2, 1979, granting custody of the children to 
the wife;42 The judgment included no provisions for child support, 
alimony, or property division, but referred to the parties' agreement: 
''Signed agreement filed herewith is not merged into this judgment but 
shall have independent significance, all until further order of the Court."43 
In April1979 the wife filed a complaint for modification of the judgment, 
seeking an increase in the husband's alimony and child support pay-
mentsf4 The husband raised the separation agreement as a bar to the 
requested relief, and sought dismissal of the complaint.45 In February 
1981, when the action came before the probate judge, both parties pre-
sented evidence on the question of whether the wife's health had deterior-
ated, necessitating an increase in support.46 The parties presented scant 
evidence with respect to the children's current needs.47 
In his findings the probate judge observed that the husband's financial 
circumstances had improved since entry of the judgment, while the wife's 
health and ability to work had deteriorated.48 On the basis of these 
observations, the judge concluded that the agreement was unfair and 
unreasonable and could be disregarded.49 He held that the material change 
in the husband's and wife's circumstances justified additional support, 
and ordered the husband to make support payments to the wife in excess 
of the amount fixed in the separation agreement.50 The husband ap-
pealed.51 
37 17 Mass. App. Ct. 24, 25, 30 n.4, 455 N.E.2d 995, 998 n.4 (1983). 
38 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 25, 455 N.E.2d at 996. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. at 26, 455 N.E.2d at 997. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. at 26, 455 N.E.2d at 996-97. 
43 /d. at 28, 455 N.E.2d at 997. 
44 /d. at 27, 455 N.E.2d at 998. 
45 Id. at 28, 455 N.E.2d at 998. 
46 /d. 
47 /d. 
48 /d. at 30, 455 N.E.2d at 998-99. 
49 /d. 
50 /d. at 30, 455 N.E.2d at 999. 
51 /d. 
5
Chardak et al.: Chapter 16: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
486 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 16.1 
The Appeals Court reversed the probate judge and dismissed the wife's 
complaint seeking modification of the divorce judgment. 52 The court 
noted, first, that the qualification "all until further order of the court" did 
not incorporate the agreement into the judgment. 53 Thus, the provisions 
for child support and alimony were not contained in the judgment. 54 The 
relevant inquiry, then, according to the court, was whether the agreement 
was fair and reasonable at the time of the entry of the judgment nisi. 55 On 
the issue of fairness and reasonableness, the court noted that both parties 
to the comprehensive, twenty-two page separation agreement had inde-
pendent legal counsel of their own choosing. 56 The court noted further the 
parties' declaration in the agreement that each entered into the agreement 
voluntarily after being fully apprised of all the relevant facts.57 According 
to the court, such an agreement could not be deemed unfair or unreason-
able.58 Evidence that one party might have struck a better deal, the court 
stated, would not render the agreement unfair or unreasonable.59 
The court then considered two other factors that, if present, might have 
precluded the husband's defense of specific enforcement of the contract 
with respect to interspousal support.60 The court noted first that the wife 
could have alleged that she was in danger of becoming a public charge.61 
Second, according to the court, she could have alleged that her former 
husband had failed to comply with any provision of the agreement. 62 
Either of these factors might have made specific enforcement of the 
contract an inequitable remedy, the court stated, but neither was demon-
strated on these facts.63 The court further noted that the record failed to 
show an inadequate level of child support that might justify modification 
$2 ld. at 32, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. The appeals court prefaced its analysis by stating that it 
would not reverse findings made by the probate judge on the evidence unless they were 
clearly erroneous.Id. at 25, 455 N.E.2d at 996. On the record before it, which included a 
transcript of all the evidence, the court held that the probate judge's findings were indeed 
clearly erroneous. See id. at 26, 455 N.E.2d at 996. 
53 Id. at 25 n.1, 455 N.E.2d at 997 n.l. 
54 Id. at 25, 455 N.E.2d at 997. The court's conclusion that the support provisions were 
not contained in the judgment, but only in the agreement, meant that they were not 
modifiable at the probate judge's discretion, since the judge has no power to alter the terms 
of a separation agreement. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4 and 28. 
5$ I d. at 30 n.6, 455 N .E.2d at 999 n.6. An agreement need not be specifically enforced if 
unfair or unreasonable at the time of its adoption. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
06 Id. at 25, 455 N.E.2d at 997. 
57 Id. at 31, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. 
58 ld. 
$ 9 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 ld. at 31-32, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. 
62 Id. at 32, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. 
83 Id. at 31-32, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. 
6
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of the child support obligations. 64 The probate judge's finding of a material 
change in circumstances, the court concluded, was insufficient to justify 
his refusing specific enforcement of a valid separation agreement.65 
The Moore and Randall cases reinforce the emerging judicial policy 
favoring separation agreements. In Moore the Court rejected the language 
of earlier cases,66 relied on by the husband, that the probate court's 
authority to issue or modify a judgment nisi of divorce may not be 
abridged by a valid separation agreement.67 In forceful and expansive 
language, the Court expressed a broad policy favoring both the survival of 
separation agreements and their enforcement by the probate court. After 
Moore, parties to a separation agreement will be held to their bargain 
unless the probate court finds the agreement to have been unfair, unrea-
sonable, or the J)loduct of fraud or coercion at the time it was signed. 
The Randall court followed Moore in holding that the provisions in a 
separation agreement fixing interspousal support should be specifically 
enforced, in the absence of countervailing equities. Those equities would 
include the probability that one party would become a public charge 
without increased support, or the failure of the former spouse to comply 
with the provisions of the agreement. 68 The court reaffirmed the rule that 
child support provisions in a separation agreement are not to be controlled 
by the parents' bargain, 69 but noted that in this case no evidence of the 
children's circumstances was presented to warrant modification of the 
existing provisions. Randall also reinforced the rule that a mere change in 
circumstances is not sufficient to justify a court's refusal to specifically 
enforce an agreement. 
Both Moore and Randall demonstrate that a surviving separation 
agreement exacts literal compliance from the parties. As a result, the 
practitioner must emphasize the finality ofth.e contract to his or her client, 
or must seek to insert a provision allowing for re-negotiation of the terms 
if circumstances should change materially. Moore also suggests that the 
attorney drafting a separation agreement can best ensure its survival by 
including an express provision showing the parties' intent that the agree-
ment survive. Randall indicates that the party- husband or wife- who 
might want to seek modification of support provisions in the future should 
be sure that the probate court incorporates the support terms into the 
64 /d. at 32, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. 
65 /d. 
66 See supra note 7. 
67 389 Mass. at 23, 448 N.E.2d at 1256-57. 
68 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 31-32, 455 N.E.2d at 1000. See Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 
516, 432 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1982); Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 437, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436 
(1976). 
69 See supra note 3. 
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judgment, which is modifiable, rather than merely filing the agreement 
with the judgment. Such a move, however, only puts the support provi-
sions within the scope of the probate court's discretion. It may not be 
effective against the clear policy of Moore favoring enforcement of sep-
aration agreements. 
As a result of the Moore and Randall decisions, the balance between 
separation agreements and judgments nisi of divorce has tipped clearly in 
favor of agreements. The parties' intent, as expressed in the separation 
agreement, controls whether the agreement survives the judgment and 
remains binding on the parties. The probate court, therefore, should defer 
to the parties' disposition of their obligations unless their agreement was 
unreasonable or the product of fraud at the time of adoption. The probate 
court retains broad discretion only with regard to child support. 
§ 16.2. Adoption - Dispensing with Parental Consent - Determination 
of Parental Unfitness.* Under chapter 210 section 3 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws, when the state petitions the court to permit an adoption, 
parental consent to adoption may be dispensed with if the court finds that 
such action would be in the best interests of the child. 1 In determining 
whether the best interests of the child would be served by a termination of 
parental rights, the court must consider the ability and fitness of the 
child's parents to assume parental responsibility. 2 If the child has been in 
the care of an agency for more than one year, a presumption arises under 
* Tracy A. Miner, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 16.2. 1 G.L. c. 210, § 3. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that: 
/d. 
(a) Whenever a petition for adoption is filed by a person having the care and custody 
of a child, the consent of the persons named in section two ... shall not be required if 
- ... (ii) the court hearing the petition finds that the allowance of the petition is in 
the best interests of the child, as defined in paragraph (c). 
(b) The Department of Social Services or any licensed child care agency may com-
mence a proceeding, independent of a petition for adoption ... to dispense with the 
need for consent of any person named in section two to the adoption of a child in the 
care or custody of said department or agency .... The court shall issue a decree 
dispensing with the need for said consent or notice of any petition for adoption of 
such child subsequently sponsored by said department or agency if it finds that the 
best interests of the child as defined in paragraph (c) will be served by said decree 
2 Mass. G.L. c. 210, § 3(c). This section provides, in pertinent part, that: 
/d. 
In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by issuing a 
decree dispensing with the need of consent as permitted under paragraph (b), the 
court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the child's parents 
... to assume parental responsibility, and shall also consider the plan proposed by 
the department or other agency initiating the petition. 
8
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section 3(c) of chapter 210 that the best interests of the child are served by 
dispensing with the need for parental consent to adoption.3 
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer4 
considered the constitutionality of New York's statutory proceedings for 
the termination of parental rights.5 Recognizing that natural parents have 
a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children,6 
the Supreme Court in Santosky held that before a state may completely 
sever the rights of parents to the custody of their natural child, due 
process mandates that the state support its allegations of unfitness by 
clear and convincing evidence. 7 
During the Survey year, Massachusetts courts considered the constitu-
tionality of chapter 210 of the General Laws in light of the Santosky 
decision in two separate cases. First, in Petitions of the Department of 
Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption8 (Petitions), the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the presumption that arises under sec-
tion 3(c) of chapter 210 that the best interests of the child will be served by 
dispensing with the need for parental consent to adoption is unconstitu-
tional under Santosky. 9 Second, in Petition of the Department of Social 
Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption 10 (Petition II), the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court held that chapter 210, sections 1-6 are not gener-
ally unconstitutional despite the absence of a statutorily mandated stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence for proceedings to dispense with 
parental consent to adoption brought under this chapter. 11 In Petitions 
and Petition II, cases brought under chapter 210, section 3, Massachu-
setts courts applied the clear and convincing evidence standard mandated 
3 Id. The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
If said child has been in the care of the department or licensed child care agency for 
more than one year, in each case irrespective of incidental communications or visits 
from his parent ... irrespective of a court decree awarding custody of said child to 
another and notwithstanding the absence of a court decree ordering said parents or 
other person to pay for the support of said child, there shall be a presumption that the 
best interests of the child will be served by granting a petition for adoption as 
permitted under paragraph (a) or by issuing a decree dispensing with the need for 
consent as permitted under the paragraph (b) . 
• 455 u.s. 745 (1982). 
5 Id. at 747. In Santosky, New York's statutory scheme for freeing a child for adoption 
without parental consent was attacked on due process grounds. ld. 
6 ld. at 753. 
7 Id. at 747-48. 
8 389 Mass. 793, 452 N.E.2d 497 (1983). 
9 Id. at 803, 452 N.E.2d at 503. 
10 15 Mass. App. Ct. 161, 444 N.E.2d 399 (1983). 
11 Id. at 164, 444 N.E.2d at 401. 
9
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by Santosky .12 These cases, therefore, illustrate the effect that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Santosky has had on Massachusetts law regard-
ing dispensation proceedings. 
In Petitions, 13 the probate court had allowed the petitioners from the 
Department of Social Services (''Department'') to dispense with the need 
for the natural mother's consent to adoption of her male and female twin 
children on January 21, 1982.14 On July 13, 1982, the mother requested 
reconsideration of the probate court's decision in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Santosky mandating that the state prove unfitness by 
clear and convincing evidence in parental rights termination cases. 15 In 
response, the probate judge issued a memorandum decision finding that 
the Department had met the burden of proof required by Santosky .16 The 
case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on its own motionY 
On appeal, the mother argued that the Department had failed to demon-
strate by clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit to provide for 
the best interests of her children.18 She also challenged the constitutional-
ity of the statutory presumption in chapter 210, section 3(c) that the best 
interests of the children are served by dispensing with the consent of the 
parent to adoption when the children have been in the Department's care 
for at least one year. 19 
The mother in Petitions was unmarried, unemployed, and had a history 
of psychiatric care.20 She had four children, a nine year old and a five year 
old who lived with her, and the seven year old twins who were the subject 
of the appeal.21 The twins had resided with their paternal grandparents, 
12 See Petitions, 389 Mass. at 799, 452 N.E.2d at 499; Petition II, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 
165, 444 N.E.2d at 400. 
13 389 Mass. 793, 452 N.E.2d 497 (1983). 




18 /d. at 795, 452 N.E.2d at 499. 
19 The Supreme Judicial Court requested the probate court judge to make further findings 
as to what weight he gave to the statutory presumption in arriving at his decision. /d. at 795, 
452 N .E.2d at 499. In his responsive findings, the judge indicated that he had not given the 
presumption any weight. Id. In the original conclusions of law, however, the probate judge 
had indicated that the mother had overcome the statutory presumption. /d. at 794 n.1, 452 
N.E.2d at 499 n.1. This would indicate that the judge gave the statutory presumption at least 
some weight in the original decision. 
20 /d. at 795, 452 N.E.2d at 499. 
21 /d. The record indicated that there had been a history of intervention by the Depart-
ment in relation to all of the children. /d. at 7%, 452 N .E.2d at 500. On June 26, 1979, the . 
Department filed a care and protection petition on behalf of all four children. /d. The court 
dismissed the case involving the oldest and youngest children, and gave physical and legal 
custody of the female twin and legal custody of the male twin to the Department. /d. On 
November 16, 1979, the court gave physical custody of the male twin to the Department. /d. 
10
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the prospective adoptive parents, in Alabama for more than a year.22 
The mother in Petitions had a history of calling the Department when 
she was under stress and requesting that one or more of her children be 
placed in foster care and then later reclaiming them.23 The Department 
claimed that the mother had refused to follow through on any plan pro-
posed by the Department to be reunited with the twins and that she had 
been unable to maintain a positive relationship with the social workers.24 
Although she had in the past participated in supervised visits with the 
twins, during one visit she removed them illegally from their foster 
home.25 Since that time she had been forbidden by the Department to 
make any further visits.26 Social workers testified that the mother did not 
have a warm and supportive relationship with the twins.27 Other profes-
sionals testified that the prognosis for the children was good if they were 
placed in a stable, secure home environment.28 
On these facts, the Supreme Judicial Court found that there was no 
error in the probate judge's determination that the Department had 
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was unfit. 29 The 
Court reasoned that although natural parents have a fundamental right to 
the custody of their children, that right is not absolute and must be 
balanced against the welfare of the child.30 The Court indicated that the 
parental fitness test must therefore be looked at in conjunction with the 
best interests of the child test, and that neither test may be properly 
applied to the exclusion of the other.31 After applying the parental fitness 
test and the best interests of the child test to the facts of the case, the 
Court upheld the termination of the mother's parental rights.32 
The Court found support for the finding of parental unfitness from the 
mother's repeated pattern of seeking the Department's help with the 
children.33 Although the Court acknowledged that the mere failure to 
exercise custodial rights in the past does not by itself warrant a conclusion 
In early 1980, the Department filed another care and protection petition on behalf of the 
youngest and oldest children. /d. This petition was dismissed./d. In September, 1980, the 
Department received permanent custody of the twins. /d. 
22 /d. at 795, 452 N.E.2d at 499. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. at 797, 452 N.E.2d at 500. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. at 798, 452 N.E.2d at 501. 
28 /d. 
29 Id. at 800, 452 N.E.2d at 501. 
30 ld. 
31 /d. (citing Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with 
Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 641, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975)). 
32 389 Mass. at 800. 452 N.E.2d at 502. 
33 /d. at 801, 452 N.E.2d at 503. 
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of present unfitness,34 the court distinguished one isolated instance of 
relinquishment from the repeated pattern present in the case before it. 35 
Moreover, the Court reasoned, the mother's refusal to participate in the 
various service plans offered by the Department was a further indication 
of her unfitness as a parent.36 The mother's custody of the twins' siblings 
was not an important factor,37 for the Court noted that a parent may be fit 
to bring up one child and not another.38 Reasoning that a child's welfare is 
best served in a continuous family environment, the Court held that the 
children's best interests would be served by their adoption by their 
paternal grandparents.39 
Despite its rejection of the mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the probate proceedings, the Court accepted the mother's 
argument that the statutory presumption of unfitness, arising as a result of 
the children's having been in the Department's care for more than one 
year, was unconstitutional.40 The Court reasoned that because the pre-
sumption shifts the burden of proof as to parental fitness to the parent, it 
violates the mandate of Santosky that the state prove unfitness by clear 
and convincing evidenceY Even though the Court accepted that the 
probate court did not give any weight to the statutory presumption, the 
Court held that because the probate court did not rely on the statutory 
presumption in the mother's case, the decision did not violate her con-
stitutional rights.42 Finding that there was clear and convincing evidence 
of her unfitness, the Court in Petitions affirmed the probate court's order 
dispensing with the need for the mother's consent to the adoption of the 
twins.43 
In the second case during the Survey year, Petition Il,44 the Appeals 
Court also upheld the termination of parental rights in the face of a 
mother's challenge to the constitutionality of the termination under San-
tosky. 45 As was the case with Petitions, 46 the original termination decision 
in Petition II was issued before the Supreme Court decided Santosky .47 A 
34 Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 577, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (1980). 
35 Petitions, 389 Mass. at 801, 452 N.E.2d at 503. 
36 Id. 
37 At the hearing, a social worker testified that "the mother was functioning well with 
regard to the oldest and youngest children." Id. at 801 n.5, 452 N.E.2d at 502 n.5. 
38 Id. at 799, 452 N.E.2d at 501-02. 
39 /d. at 800, 452 N .E.2d at 501. 
40 Id. at 803, 452 N.E.2d at 502. 
41 Id. at 802-03, 452 N.E.2d at 503. 
42 Id. at 803, 452 N.E.2d at 503. 
43 Id. 
44 15 Mass. App. Ct. 161, 444 N.E.2d 399 (1983). 
45 Id. at 165, 444 N.E.2d at 401. 
48 389 Mass. 793, 452 N.E.2d 497 (1983). 
47 15 Mass. App. Ct at 163, 444 N.E.2d at 400. 
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single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed an appeal from the 
decision with instructions to seek from the probate judge a supplemental 
finding concerning the effect the clear and convincing evidence standard, 
if applied, would have had on the probate judge's findings. 48 The probate 
judge on rehearing affirmed his termination order and indicated that his 
decision would not be changed under the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.49 In her appeal, the mother claimed that the clear and convinc-
ing standard had not been met and that, consequently, the termination 
violated her constitutional rights.50 
The evidence of unfitness in Petition II related primarily to the mother's 
immaturity. 51 The court summarized the probate court's findings of fact as 
showing a well-intentioned, immature mother, about sixteen years old, 
who was unable to deal with the needs of her son.52 Based on these 
findings, the probate judge found that the best interests of the child would 
be served by his adoption by his foster parents, an upwardly mobile 
professional couple with one child of their own.53 
The Appeals Court affirmed the probate court's determination that the 
mother's unfitness had been established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.54 The court gave great deference to the decision of the probate 
judge.55 Reasoning that unfitness depends on an assessment of the par-
ent's character, temperament and capacity, as well as the consideration of 
the welfare of the child in connection with its age and affections, the court 
held that the probate judge's conclusion of unfitness was well supported. 56 
As in Petitions, the court did not discuss the child's interest in having 
continuing ties with his natural mother and sibling.57 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Petitions58 and the Appeals 
Court's decision in Petition Il59 indicate that the Santosky mandate of a 
clear and convincing evidence standard in termination of parental rights 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 163-64, 444 N.E.2d at 400. 
5o Id. 
51 Id. at 162, 444 N.E.2d at 400. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. The probate judge indicated that the foster parents lived in a suburban neigh-
borhood./d. "The husband is a high-school graduate, soon to receive his bachelor's degree, 
and is employed by a well-known company as a computer specialist." Jd. 
54 Id. at 165, 444 N.E.2d at 401. 
55 Id. The court, in affirming the probate court's finding that the clear and convincing 
standard had been met, stated: "There is no reason to doubt that he honestly and reasonably 
was of the opinion that the evidence met that standard at all times and that he had been 
satisfied with the evidence in accordance with that standard." I d. 
56 Id. at 165, 444 N.E.2d at 401. 
57 See id. at 164-65, 444 N.E.2d at 400.01. 
58 389 Mass. 793, 452 N.E.2d 497 (1983). 
09 15 Mass. App. a. 161, 444 N.E.2d 399 (1983). 
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proceedings will have little practical effect on the outcome of cases 
decided under Chapter 210, section 3.60 While a lengthy separation of a 
parent from his or her child may no longer shift the burden of proving 
unfitness from the state to the parent,61 a long separation may still form 
the basis for a finding of parental unfitness. Refusal to cooperate with the 
Department may in itself be enough evidence to establish unfitness under 
the Santosky mandate.62 In the absence of clear guidelines by the appel-
late courts on the application of the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard, probate judges will most likely continue to determine parental 
unfitness based on the same criteria they used prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Santosky. 
As applied by the Supreme Judicial Court in Petitions 63 and the Appeals 
Court in Petition Il,64 the clear and convincing evidence standard man-
dated by Santosky does not sufficiently protect the fundamental right of 
natural parents to the custody of their children.65 Too much deference is 
paid to the findings and authority of the child care agencies. 66 This defer-
ence may have contributed to the further deterioration of the parent-child 
relationship after the child had been placed within their care.67 As part of 
meeting its burden of proof under Santosky, the child care agency seeking 
to dispense with the consent of the parent to adoption should be required 
to show that it made good faith efforts to reunite the parent with the child. 
As the Appeals Court has stated, "The Department should 'take care to 
behave itself.' . . . Heads I win, tails you lose is as offensive in this 
context as in any other area of governmental action. " 68 Moreover, courts 
should consider the alternative of continued custody by the Department 
with visitation rights by the parent as an alternative to total relinquish-
ment of parental rights or relinquishment of custody by the Department. 
This should be done whether or not the parent directly proposes this 
alternative. Such an alternative may be preferable, in many instances, to 
the total severance of biological ties. 
60 The probate judges in Petitions and Petition II indicated that their findings would not 
have been altered under the clear and convincing evidence standard of Santosky. See 
Petitions, 389 Mass. at 794, 452 N.E.2d at 499; Petition II, 15 Mass. App. Ct at 163, 444 
N.E.2d at 400. 
61 389 Mass. at 803, 452 N.E.2d at 503. 
62 See id. at 801, 452 N.E.2d at 502. 
63 389 Mass. 793, 452 N.E.2d 497 (1983). 
64 15 Mass. App. Ct 161, 444 N.E.2d 399 (1983). 
65 389 Mass. at 799, 452 N.E.2d at 501. 
66 In Petitions, the court based its findings of parental unfitness in part on the mother's 
refusal to cooperate with the Department, despite the mother's claim that the Department 
repeatedly attempted to sever all family ties. See 389 Mass. at 801, 452 N.E.2d at 502. 
67 In Petitions, the Department precluded the parent from visiting the child. 389 Mass. at 
797, 452 N.E.2d at 500. 
68 Commonwealth v. Tirrell, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 334, 345 (Kaplan, J. dissenting). 
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In summary, the state now has the burden of proving parental unfitness 
by clear and convincing evidence before the rights of a parent may be 
totally and irrevocably severed. The decisions in Petitions and Petition II 
during the Survey year indicate that this burden will have little practical 
effect on decisions under Chapter 210, section 3 of the General Laws. The 
state, however, will no longer be able to rely on a presumption of unfit-
ness in situations where the separation has lasted over one year, as was 
the case prior to the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Petitions. In 
addition, courts may be more willing to explore alternatives to total 
revocation of parental rights, thereby making a dispensation decree har-
der to obtain. Despite the decisions in Petitions and Petition II during the 
Survey year, however, probate courts are still left with the difficult task of 
balancing the fundamental rights of parents to custody of their children 
against the welfare of the children, . with little guidance from appellate 
courts as how to best achieve a result that will further the best interests of 
the child and society at large. 
§ 16.3. Child Custody - Effect of Variant Lifestyle By One Parent on 
Child Custody.* The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has articu-
lated two tests that apply in evaluating the facts in custody proceedings. 
One such standard applied by the Massachusetts courts is the "best 
interest of the child" test. 1 Under this standard the first and paramount 
consideration is the welfare of the child. 2 Another standard applied by the 
courts is the "parental fitness" test.3 This test focuses on parental rights 
rather than on the child's welfare.4 Under the parental fitness test, the 
courts assess whether the parents exhibit traits of "moral delinquency 
... indifference or ... vacillation of feeling toward the child, or inability 
or indisposition to control . . . . '' 5 
Originally, the Massachusetts courts viewed the best interest of the 
child as the dominant standard used in child custody cases.6 Over the 
* Sharon R. Chardak, staff member ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 16.3. 1 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor (l), 377 Mass. 876, 882, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979); 
Custody of a Minor (2), 378 Mass. 712, 718, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 (1979). 
2 See Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 572, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (1980). See 
generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD (1973). 
3 Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 552-53, 180 N.E. 508, 510-11 (1932). 
4 I d. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach 
to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 66 GEO. L. REv. 213, 231-40 (1979). 
5 Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. at 552-53, 180 N.E. at 510-11. For a discussion of this 
standard, see Comment, King Solomon's Court: Reconciling the Interests of Parent, Child 
and State Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 15 NEW ENG. L. REv. 853, 862-64 (1980). 
6 The leading case of Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907), is often 
quoted when discussing this standard. There, the Court said: 
[Parents] are the natural guardians of their child, entitled to its custody .... But this 
15
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years, the Massachusetts courts have withdrawn from this position.7 
Today, both the best interest of the child and parental fitness tests are 
applied in custody disputes with varying emphasis depending upon 
whether the custody dispute is between a natural parent and a third 
party,8 a natural parent and the state,9 or between two natural parents. 10 
In custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party, and 
between a natural parent and the state, the inquiry has typically focused 
on whether the parents are "fit" to provide for the welfare of the child.U 
In these cases, however, the standard of parental fitness is broadly con-
strued so that removal from the parents is upheld only when the child has 
been physically abused or denied the basic necessities of life.12 In pro-
ceedings between two natural parents, on the other hand, the best interest 
of the child standard has predominated.13 Although the courts in these 
right is not an absolute and uncontrollable one. It will not be enforced to the detriment 
or destruction of the happiness and well being of the child. As the child owes 
allegiance to the government of the country of its birth, so it is entitled to the 
protection of that government, which must consult its welfare, comfort and interests 
Id. at 201, 80 N.E. at 805 (citations omitted). 
7 See Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 641, 328 
N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975). There the Court found that the best interest of the child test and the 
parental fitness test "reflect different degrees of emphasis on the same factors, that the tests 
are not separate and distinct but cognate and connected." ld. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860. 
8 See Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 577, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (1980). 
9 See Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631,646, 328 
N.E.2d 854, 863 (1975). 
10 See Fuller v. Fuller, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 376, 312 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1974). 
11 See Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980), where the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court stated that a homosexual mother must be found "unfit" before 
custody could be moved from her and given to a third party guardian. Id. at 577,410 N.E.2d 
at 1215; Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631,328 N.E.2d 
854 (1974), where the Supreme Judicial Court held that a parent must suffer from "grievous 
shortcomings or handicaps, that would put the child's welfare in the family milieu much at 
hazard" in order for custody to be removed from the mother./d. at 646, 328 N.E.2d at 863. 
12 See Custody of a Minor (2), 378 Mass. 712, 393 N.E.2d 379 (1979), where the Supreme 
Judicial Court stated that the critical question that must be asked when the state seeks to 
intervene is: "From what shortcomings or handicaps does the parent suffer that would 
endanger the well-being of the child if exposed, and has the necessity of permanently 
removing the child from its parents persuasively been shown?" /d. at 722, 393 N.E.2d at 
385. See generally Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 
26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974). 
13 See Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 171 N.E. 815 (1930), where the Supreme Judicial 
Court enunciated the basic rule applicable in a custody dispute between two natural parents: 
"The governing principle by which the court must be guided in deciding the issues raised is 
the welfare of the child. This is so both as [sic] matter oflaw and as [sic] matter of humanity. 
Every public and private consideration establishes the dominating rule." /d. at 555, 171 
N.E. at 820. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 582, 584 (1%8). 
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three types of custody cases appear to place differing emphasis on the two 
standards, they have failed to formulate an explicit rule regarding the 
correct application of the two standards. 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals 
Court decided three cases involving custody disputes. Although these 
decisions clarify somewhat the interrelation between the best interest and 
the parental fitness standards, they nevertheless fail once again to supply 
clear rules regarding the correct application of the two tests .14 In the first 
case, Freeman v. Chap lie, 15 the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with a 
dispute between a third party, and a mother and the custodians selected 
by the mother.16 In Custody of a Minor, 11 the Supreme Judicial Court 
dealt with a custody dispute between a woman, in whose care the mother 
had voluntarily placed the child, and the natural mother.18 In Doe v. 
Doe, 19 the Appeals Court considered a custody dispute between the 
child's natural father and natural mother, who was a homosexual.20 In 
each of these cases, the courts purported to apply both tests, but never-
theless seemed to favor one or the other depending on the relationship 
among the parties to the dispute. 
In Freeman v. Chaplic,21 the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed ajudg-
ment of the probate court that vacated the appointment of the paternal 
grandparents as guardians with custody, and substituted the maternal 
step-grandmother as guardian with custody. The child in dispute was born 
several months after her parents separated.22 Shortly after the birth, due 
to the mother's psychological problems, the child moved with her mother 
to the maternal grandfather's and step-grandmother's home.23 Shortly 
thereafter, the parents' divorce decree became final and the decree 
awarded the maternal grandparents guardianship with custody of the 
child.24 
Seven years later, the mother remarried and regained custody of the 
14 Freeman v. Chaplic, 388 Mass. 398, 446 N .E.2d 1369 (1983); Custody of a Minor, 389 
Mass. 755, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 
(1983). 
15 388 Mass. 398, 446 N.E.2d 1369 (1983). 
16 Id. at 404, 446 N.E.2d at 1373. 
17 389 Mass. 755, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983). 
18 Id. at 767, 452 N.E.2d at 490. 
19 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983). 
20 Jd. at 501, 452 N.E.2d at 295. 
21 388 Mass. 398, 446 N.E.2d 1369 (1983). 
22 I d. at 400, 446 N .E.2d at 1371. 
23 I d. The maternal step-grandmother married the maternal grandfather when the mother 
of the child in dispute was ten years old. I d. 
24 Id. 
17
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child.25 The mother, however, separated from her husband and again 
developed psychological problems. 26 The child returned to the maternal 
step-grandmother's home. 27 The paternal grandparents, with the assent of 
the parents, then obtained custody of the child.28 The child moved to the 
paternal grandparents' home and lived there along with her mother and 
older siblings.29 The maternal step-grandmother succeeded in regaining 
guardianship with custody of the child.30 A single justice of the Appeals 
Court, however, stayed the probate court judgment pending appeal.31 
Subsequently, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. 32 The paternal 
grandparents appealed and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court 
issued an order for the child to remain with them pending the decision of 
the Supreme Judicial Court. 33 The Court reversed the judgment of the 
probate court and ordered the reinstatement of the judgment appointing 
the paternal grandparents guardians with custody .34 
25 Id. There were only two brief periods over this seven year period when the child lived 
with her mother. /d. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. The maternal grandfather had recently died. /d. 
28 /d. at 401, 446 N.E.2d at 1371. The maternal grandmother received no notice of this 
appointment. The state makes no provision for notice. G.L. c. 201, §§ 2 and 5. 388 Mass. at 
401 n.5, 446 N.E.2d at 1371 n.5. 
29 At this point, the mother, the child in dispute and the mother's first two children were 
living together at the home of the paternal grandparents. The paternal grandparents had 
adopted the mother./d. at 401, 446 N.E.2d at 1371-72. 
30 /d. at 401, 446 N.E.2d at 1372. 
31 /d. The judge also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. /d. First, he found 
both the maternal step-grandmother and the paternal grandparents ''fully capable'' of caring 
for the child. /d. Second, he found that the parents had the capacity to assent to the 
appointment of the paternal grandparents as guardians./d. Third, he found the assent had 
little weight because the father seldom made contact with the child and the mother continued 
to suffer from emotional problems. /d. Fifth, he found the plan assented to by the child's 
parents was well designed to maintain close familial ties. /d. at 401-02. Sixth, he found it 
would be in the best interest of the child if the maternal step-grandmother was appointed 
guardian. /d. at 402, 446 N.E.2d at 1372. 
32 /d. at 399, 446 N.E.2d at 1370. 
33 /d. Due to the orders of the single justices of the Appeals Court and the Supreme 
Judicial Court, the child lived with the paternal grandparents during the judicial proceedings. 
/d. at 402. 446 N.E.2d at 1372. 
34 /d. at 409, 446 N .E.2d at 1376. In reversing, the Supreme Judicial Court first found that 
the maternal step-grandmother's motion for revocation of the decree could have been 
brought under G.L. c. 201, § 33, which gives the power to a probate court judge to remove a 
guardian under the circumstances specified in the statute. 388 Mass. at 401, 446 N.E.2d at 
1372. The Court found that since the maternal step-grandmother was concerned with the 
well-being of the child, she could act as the child's next friend and seek to have a guardian 
removed as unsuitable. /d. The Court concluded that the motion brought by the maternal 
grandmother was properly before the probate court, and therefore the judge did not abuse 
his discretion by entertaining this motion. /d. at 402, 446 N.E.2d at 1372. 
18
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The Freeman Court set out a two-prong test to be used in determining 
whether a judge may vacate the appointment of one relative as guardian 
with custody of a child and appoint another relative, who the parents 
desired, without first finding that the parents were unfit.35 The first prong 
of this test, the Court noted, is whether the present guardians are suitable 
to have custody of the child.36 The second prong of this test is whether the 
parents are fit to have custody of the childY The Court explained that 
only if the first inquiry reveals that the guardians are unsuitable would the 
second inquiry, concerning parental fitness, become necessary. 38 The 
Court based this two-prong test for determining custody in disputes be-
tween two relatives, where the parents desire one of the relatives to be 
guardians, on three Massachusetts laws. 
The Court first discussed chapter 201, section 1, which allows a probate 
court to appoint a guardian for a child if the parents are unable to care for 
that child. 39 This appointment, however, does not extinguish the parents' 
right to custody of the child.40 Rather, the question of custody must be 
determined by reference to chapter 201, section 5.41 This section provides 
that parents shall have custody of their children unless the court finds that 
the parents are unfit to have custody .42 Absent the parents' consent, 




39 See G.L. c. 119, § 1 which provides in pertinent part: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct its efforts, first, 
to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection and care of 
children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of all available resources to 
this end; and to provide substitute care of children only when the family itself or the 
resources available to the family are unable to provide the necessary care and 
protection to insure the rights of any child to sound health and normal physical, 
mental, spiritual and moral development. 
The purpose of this chapter is to insure that the children of the commonwealth are 
protected against the harmful effects resulting from the absence, inability, inadequacy 
or destructive behavior of parents or parent substitutes, and to assure good substitute 
parental care in the event of the absence, temporary or permanent inability or 
unfitness of parents to provide care and protection for their children. 
See Custody of a Minor (l), 377 Mass. 876, 882 n.5, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 n.5 (1979). 
40 388 Mass. at 403, 446 N.E.2d at 1373. 
41 Id. G.L. c. 201, § 5 provides in pertinent part: 
The guardian of a minor shall have the custody of his person and the care of his 
education, except that the parents of a minor, jointly, or the surviving parent shall 
have such custody and said care unless the court otherwise orders. The probate court 
may, upon the written consent of the parents or surviving parent, order that the 
guardian shall have such custody; and may so order if, upon a hearing and after such 
notice to the parents ... it finds such parents ... unfit to have such custody .... 
42 388 Mass. at 403, 446 N.E.2d at 1373; See G.L. c. 201, § 5. 
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therefore, the only way a court could give custody of the child to the 
guardian instead of to the parents would be to find that the parents were 
unfit.43 The guardian who replaced the parent as custodian of the child 
could, however, be removed as provided in chapter 201, section 33.44 This 
section provides that a guardian will be removed if found unfit to care for 
the child and a more suitable successor will be appointed to fill the 
vacancy. 45 
Applying this two-prong test to the facts in Freeman, the Court deter-
mined that neither the mother nor the paternal grandparents, the present 
guardians, were unfit to be custodians of the child. 46 In reaching this 
determination of the mother's fitness and of the suitability of the paternal 
grandparents, the Court reasoned that the child had not suffered any 
physical or emotional harm from living with her mother or paternal 
grandparents.47 Rather, the Court found that the probate court's findings 
demonstrated that the mother, with the assistance of the paternal grand-
parents, was fit to further the welfare and the best interests of the child. 48 
After finding the mother and paternal grandparents suitable as custo-
dians, the Court concluded that the probate court's decision, which 
awarded custody to the maternal step-grandmother, could not be recon-
ciled with the terms of chapter 201, sections 5 and 33, because the mother 
43 /d. 
44 388 Mass. at 403-04; 446 N.E.2d at 1373. G.L. c. 201, § 33, provides in pertinent part: 
If a guardian or conservator becomes mentally ill or otherwise incapable of perform-
ing his trust or is unsuitable therefor, the probate court, after notice to him and to all 
other persons interested, may remove him. If the petition for removal contains a 
prayer therefor the court may, upon such notice as it considers reasonable, appoint a 
successor to fill any vacancy caused by such removal, without the filing of a separate 
petition for that purpose. 
45 See G.L. c. 201, § 33. 
46 388 Mass. at 405, 446 N.E.2d at 1374. The Court first found the guardians suitable and 
therefore concluded that it need not reach the question of parental fitness. /d. at 404, 446 
N.E.2d at 1373. The Court decided, however, that they would address both issues because 
they disagreed with the Appeals Court's approach to the case. /d. 
The Appeals Court had held that the judge did not need to make a finding of parental 
unfitness before appointing a guardian with custody, despite the lack of parental consent./ d. 
The Appeals Court reasoned that this case was a contest between grandparents and there-
fore the fitness of the parent had little relevance. /d. According to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the Appeals Court relied on "its view of the general equity powers of the probate 
court" and concluded "that the judge was free to follow its own vision of 'the best interest of 
the child' and appoint the [maternal step-grandmother] guardian with custody." /d. 
47 388 Mass. at 405,446 N.E.2d at 1374. The Court contrasted this case with Custody of a 
Minor(3), 383 Mass 595,421 N.E.2d 63 (1981), where the trial court judge had found that the 
removal of the child from the foster parents would result in ''serious deleterious effects,'' I d. 
at 601, 421 N.E.2d at 66, with Wilkins v. Wilkins, 324 Mass. 261, 85 N.E.2d 768 (1949), 
where the probate court judge found that the child suffered psychological harm after visiting 
her parents. /d. at 263, 85 N.E.2d at 769. 
48 388 Mass. at 405-06, 446 N.E.2d at 1374. 
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had not been found unfit under section 5, and the paternal grandparents 
had not been found unsuitable under section 33.49 The Court concluded 
that these findings, together with the mother's consent to the paternal 
grandparents' guardianship, did not permit the probate court to terminate 
the paternal grandparents' guardianship and substitute the maternal 
grandmother in their stead.50 
In recognizing that the parent's assent to the paternal grandparents' 
guardianship with custody should be considered, the Court nonetheless 
warned that a judge is not bound to follow the parent's wishes in every 
caseY The parent's desires could be ignored, according to the Court, if 
the guardians were found' 'unsuitable'' within the meaning of chapter 201, 
section 33.52 If the guardians were found unsuitable, then the judge could 
consider the parent's fitness to have custody of the child. 53 In making this 
determination of fitness, the Court noted that a judge should consider the 
ability of the parents to care for the child or their ability to make alterna-
tive arrangements for the child's care.54 If the parents are found fit under 
this test, then the judge is bound under chapter 201, section 5 to "grant 
custody to them, or, in the alternative, to honor their wishes to the extent 
permitted by statute, on the choice of a guardian." 55 
The Court found support for its holding from principles espoused in 
past Massachusetts cases.56 According to the Court, these cases estab-
lished the principle that a state's intervention against the wishes of the 
parents must serve some substantial state interest. 57 The Court concluded 
that the substantial interest test was not met because no state interest 
would be advanced by granting custody to the maternal step-
grandmother, who the parents opposed, when the parents were fit and the 
guardians they chose were suitable.58 
49 /d. at 406; 446 N.E.2d at 1374. 
50 /d. 
51 Jd. at 406, 446 N.E.2d at 1375. 
52 /d. at 405-06, 446 N.E.2d at 1375. 
53 Jd. at 407, 446 N.E.2d at 1375. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. The Court in espousing this principle cited the first sentence of G.L. c. 201, § 5, 
which reads as follows: "The guardian of a minor shall have the custody of his person and 
the care of his education, except that the parents of the minor, jointly, or the surviving 
parent shall have such custody and said care unless the court otherwise orders." For full 
text of this statute, see supra note 41. 
56 388 Mass. at 407, 446 N.E.2d at 1375. 
57 !d. 
ss /d. The Court mentioned that a different finding would raise serious constitutional 
difficulties. /d. The Court, however, did not address these difficulties, deciding that the 
Court's "resolution of the case relieves [it] of the duty to decide whether that resolution is 
also mandated by constitutional principles." /d. at 407 n.l6, 446 N .E.2d at 1375 n.l6. 
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In a second custody case decided during the Survey year, Custody of a 
Minor, 59 the Supreme Judicial Court was again faced with the application 
of the parental fitness test and the best interest of the child test. This case 
differed from Freeman, however, because the dispute was between a 
third party and the natural mother rather than between a third party and 
the custodian the parent had selected.60 The child in dispute was born out 
of wedlock. 61 For the first seven years of the child's life the mother and 
child moved from place to place in the United States and England, finally 
settling in Hawaii.62 Soon after they moved to Hawaii, the mother made 
arrangements for the child to stay with a caretaker63 and attend school 
while the mother worked elsewhere in the state.64 Sometime later the 
caretaker, with the mother's permission, took the child to live in Massa-
chusetts. 55 The mother and the caretaker communicated regularly by mail 
until the time when the mother traveled to Massachusetts to visit the 
child.66 During this visit, the mother planned a trip for the child to Hawaii, 
but the child refused to go.67 On the day the trip was scheduled, the 
mother returned to the caretaker's home and demanded the child.68 The 
police were called and the mother retained counsel.69 
The Department of Social Services ("Department") filed a care and 
protection petition pursuant to chapter 119, section 24.70 This section 
59 389 Mass. 755, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983). 
60 /d. at 756, 452 N.E.2d at 484. 
61 /d. at 757, 452 N .E.2d at 485. This was the mother's second child; she gave up her first 
child for adoption shortly after its birth. /d. 
62 /d. Among the places the mother and child lived were a farm in Virginia, a commune in 
Scotland, and a religious sect in California. /d. at 757-58, 452 N.E.2d at 485. 
63 No legal guardianship was created. /d. at 757-58, 452 N.E.2d at 486. 
64 /d. at 757-58, 452 N.E.2d at 485. The mother left the child with the caretaker and went 
to live with a man fifty miles away. The mother occasionally visited the child./d. at 757-58, 
452 N.E.2d at 485-86. 
65 /d. at 759, 452 N.E.2d at 486. 
66 /d. at 760, 452 N.E.2d at 486. The mother, according to the trial judge, continued to 





70 /d. at 756, 452 N.E.2d at 484. G.L. c~· 119, § 24, provides in pertinent part: 
The Boston juvenile court ... [list of the other Massachusetts courts], upon the 
petition of any person alleging on behalf of a child under the age of eighteen years 
within the jurisdiction of said court that said child is without necessary and proper 
physical, educational or moral care and discipline, or is growing up under conditions 
or circumstances damaging to a child's sound character development, or who lacks 
proper attention of parent, guardian with care and custody, or custodian, and whose 
parents or guardians are unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide such care, 
may issue a precept to bring such child before said court, shall issue a notice to the 
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provides that a care and protection petition can be filed by anyone who 
has reason to believe that a child is being abused or neglected or is without 
proper care. 71 The district court adjudicated the child in need of care and 
protection and awarded legal custody to the Department.72 The mother 
appealed and the caretaker filed a motion tO dismiss. 73 The motion was 
denied and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Court. 74 The appeal 
was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on the Court's motion.75 
The Supreme Judicial Court first addressed the validity of the procedures 
the district court followed.76 The Court reversed the district court's order 
transferring custody to the Department, finding that the custody dispute 
was not a proper subject for a care and protection proceeding. 77 Rather, 
the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the custody dispute should 
have been litigated as a guardianship proceeding in the probate and family 
court pursuant to chapter 201, section 5.78 
After concluding that the district court's procedure for resolving the 
custody dispute was incorrect, the Court reviewed the substantive 
findings of the district court to determine if the district court erroneously 
awarded physical custody of the child to the caretaker and legal custody 
department, and shall issue summonses to both parents of the child to show cause 
why the child should not be committed to the custody of the department or other 
appropriate order made. 
See also Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State 
Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEo. L.J. 213, 228 (1979). 
71 See G.L. c. 119, § 24. 
72 389 Mass. at 756, 452 N.E.2d at 484. The procedure prior to this consisted of the 
following: The district court issued an emergency order transferring custody of the child to 
the Department; a motion of the Department to withdraw as co-petitioner and substitute the 
caretaker was allowed; soon afterwards, the district court dismissed the petition and the 
caretaker appealed.1d. The case was then transferred to the juvenile appeals session of the 
district court where a trial without a jury was conducted and resulted in this finding. I d. 
73 Id. at 756, 452 N.E.2d at 485. 
74 ld. 
75 I d. The Supreme Judicial Court may directly transfer from a lower court any case, in 
whole or in part, to its docket. See G.L. c. 211, § 4A. 
76 389 Mass. at 770, 452 N.E.2d at 492. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that there was 
no objection in the district court to the procedure followed.ld. at 761, 452 N.E.2d at 487. 
Moreover, the appellant did not question either the propriety of the caretaker's substitution 
as petitioner or whether the caretaker was entitled to a de novo appeal from the dismissal of 
the petition. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court, nonetheless, decided to address these pro-
cedural issues because it found that the procedural infirmities had a bearing on the case.Id. 
77 Id. at 762, 452 N.E.2d at 487-88. The Supreme Judicial Court distinguished this case 
from several cases where the custody proceedings were brought under the care and protec-
tion statute, G.L. c. 119, § 24. The Court cited Custody of a Minor (3), 378 Mass. 732, 744, 
393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (1979) and Custody of a Mil)or ( /), 377 Mass. at 881, 389 N.E.2d at 72. 
76 389 Mass. at 762, 452 N .E.2d at 487-88. The Supreme Judicial Court next addressed the 
question of the appellant's right to a de novo appeal.Id. at 762-63, 487 N.E.2d at 488. This 
issue, however, will not be discussed in this chapter. 
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to the Department. 79 The Court laid out the framework to be used in 
deciding whether a child should be removed from his or her parents. 80 The 
Court noted that Chapter 119, section 1, requires the Commonwealth to 
use its efforts to preserve and strengthen the family. 81 The Court em-
phasized that, at common law, parents are presumed to have a natural 
right to the care and custody of their children, but parental rights are not 
absolute and "must yield to the welfare of the child. " 82 In order to remove 
a child from his natural parents, the Court noted, an affirmative showing 
of parental unfitness is necessary. 83 In requiring this showing of parental 
unfitness, the Court stressed that the state may not intrude into the family 
just because a prospective guardian is thought to be better qualified or 
because the court may disapprove of the natural parent's lifestyle.84 
Parents are to be measured, cautioned the Court, not only by their 
conduct or character, but also by their ability to further the best interests 
of the child.85 
The Constitution, the Court noted, requires that "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence of parental unfitness be found before a child may be 
removed from his or her natural parents. 86 The removal may only be 
ordered based on a "specific and detailed" finding that removal is neces-
79 Id. at 761-62, 452 N.E.2d at 488-89 
80 Id. at 764-70, 452 N.E.2d at 489-92 
81 Id. at 764-65, 452 N.E.2d at 489. For text of G.L. c. 119, § 1, see supra note 39. 
82 Id. at 765, 452 N.E.2d at 489. 
83 Id. See Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 589, 421 N .E.2d 28, 37 (1981); Custody of a Minor (I), 377 Mass. at 
882, 389 N.E.2d at 72. 
84 389 Mass. at 765, 452 N.E.2d at 489. The Court cited Petition of the New England 
Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 640, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975). 
85 389 Mass. at 765-66; 452 N .E.2d at 489-90. The Court emphasized that fitness of the 
parents and the best interests of the child are related. Id. at 766, 452 N.E.2d at 490. Several 
past Supreme Judicial Court cases have also articulated this interrelationship. See, e.g., 
Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 
Mass. 573, 589, 421 N.E.2d 28, 38 (1981); Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 576-77, 410 
N.E.2d 1207, 1214-15 (1980); Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 
Mass. 631, 641, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975). 
86 389 Mass. at 766, 452 N.E.2d at 490. The Supreme Judicial Court cited Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 ( 1982), for articulating this constitutional requirement. Prior to 
this case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized a lower standard of proof. 
In Custody of a Minor ( 1), 377 Mass. at 885-86, 389 N.E.2d at 75 (1979), for instance, the 
Supreme Judicial Court found that a judge need only "exercise utmost care," as demon-
strated through specific findings of fact, in rendering a judgment that deprives a parent of 
custody. 
See also Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to 
Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 592-93, 421 N.E.2d 28, 38-39 (1981). For a discussion of the 
evidentiary standards generally and this case specifically, see Note, Domestic Relations, 
1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 3.2, at 71, 71 n.51. 
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sary in order to further the welfare of the child. 87 Consequently, before 
the district court judge could deprive the natural mother of custody, 
reasoned the Court, his "findings must support his conclusions and order, 
and it must be clear that the order was not motivated by inappropriate 
factors." 88 
Having articulated that a finding of parental unfitness requires clear and 
convincing evidence, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether the 
district court's findings supported the rem.oval of custody from the 
mother.89 The Court noted at the outset that the district court judge's 
findings and observations suggested that he may have been motivated by 
inappropriate factors when applying the parental unfitness test.90 The 
district court judge, noted the Supreme Judicial Court, determined who 
should have custody by comparing the advantages for the child of living 
with the caretaker to the advantages of living with the mother.91 This 
comparison, according to the Court, was inappropriate because the dis-
trict court did not consider the presumption that a natural mother has a 
right to raise her child.92 Moreover, the Court noted that in terminating 
the mother's parental right, the district court reli~d too heavily on an 
assessment of her unconventional lifestyle.93 The Court acknowledged 
that the district court could have considered the mother's lifestyle if it 
significantly harmed the child.94 The Supreme Judicial Court cautioned, 
however, that the state may not deprive parents of custody of their 
children because ''the parents embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at 
odds with the average." 95 In the instant case, sin ~-hadnot 
suffered any physical, mental or emot" a deficits, the mother's uncon-




91 /d. at 768, 452 N.E.2d at 491. 
92 /d. 
93 /d. at 767-68, 452 N.E.2d at 490-91. The Supreme Judicial Court found that the district 
court judge's 
focus on the mother's unconventional behavior, including her frequent moves from 
place to place, her unusual residences, unorthodox religion, vegetarianism, adher-
ence to holistic medicine, communal living, and nonmarital cohabitation with men, 
casts doubt on whether he gave sufficient recognition of the principle that '[t]he state 
may not deprive parents of custody of their children ... simply because the parents 
embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the average.' 
/d. at 767-68, 452 N.E.2d at 491 (citing Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579,410 N.E.2d 
1207, 1216 (1980) and Custody of a Minor (2), 378 Mass. 712, 719, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 
(1979)). 
94 389 Mass. at 768, 452 N.E.2d at 491. 
95 /d. 
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ventionallifestyle could not result in the district court judge's finding that 
the mother was unfit. 96 
After concluding that the mother's unconventional lifestyle did not 
render her unfit, the Court turned to the effect that should be assigned to 
the time sepl}fation between the child and mother in determining custody 
of the child. 97 The Supreme Judicial Court explained that such a separa-
tion could result in a finding of parental unfitness if the return of the child 
to the mother was "seriously detrimental to the child. " 98 In determining 
the effect of the separation, the Court stated, the district court had given 
too much weight to the fact that the mother placed the child with the 
caretaker voluntarily and had consented to this arrangement for two and 
one half years. 99 The Court found that the separation between the mother 
and child in this case did not warrant the district court's conclusion that 
the child would be harmed if returned to the mother .100 Because the return 
of the child to the mother would not be seriously detrimental to the child, 
the Court concluded that the time separation should not result in a finding 
that the mother was unfit to have custody of her child. 101 
Finally, after finding that the return of the child to the mother would not 
cause irreparable harm, the Court considered the appropriate weight that 
should be given to the child's wishes.102 The Court found that in this case 
the district court judge had given undue weight to the child's desire to 
remain with the caretaker. 103 Although the child's wishes should be con-
sidered, the Court stated that they are not dispositive.104 Rather, the 
Court stated, the controlling question is "whether the welfare of this child 
would be seriously endangered if custody is not transferred from the 
mother." 105 The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port such a conclusion. 106 Consequently, the Court reversed the district 
court and ordered that the parties be allowed to present new evidence, 
96 ld. at 767-68, 452 N.E.2d at 490-91. 
97 I d. at 768, 452 N .E.2d at 491. 
98 I d. The Court (citing Freeman v. Chaplic, 388 Mass. 398, 446 N.E.2d 483 (1983)) noted 
that parents do not give up their right to custody by choosing "a caretaker proxy." Id. 
99 ld. 
100 Id. at 768-69, 452 N.E.2d at 491. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 769, 452 N.E.2d at 491. 
1oa Id. 
104 Jd. The Supreme Judicial Court cited in support of this proposition, Custody of a 
Minor (3), 383 Mass. 595, 602, 421 N.E.2d 63, 67 (1981) (preferences of children of sufficient 
maturity may be considered). 
105 389 Mass. at 769, 452 N.E.2d at 491. 
106 Id. at 769, 452 N.E.2d at 491-92. 
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especially in light of the long period of time since the start of the case. 107 
In the third custody case, Doe v. Doe, 108 the Appeals Court was faced 
with the correct application of the parental fitness test and the best 
interest of the child test. This case differed from the Supreme Judicial 
Court cases of Freeman and Custody of a Minor, however, because it 
involved a dispute between the natural parents rather than between par-
ents and third parties.109 The child in question was six years old when his 
parents separated. 11° Following the separation, the mother took the child 
to live in a nearby city .111 Soon after the move, the mother's homosexual 
companion moved in with the mother and child. 112 
The father then brought a complaint for divorce and sought sole cus-
tody of the child. 113 A cross-complaint by the mother sought joint cus-
tody .114 A temporary order gave the parents joint legal and physical 
custody .115 The trial judge appointed a child psychiatrist as a guardian ad 
litem and also visited the parents' respective homes and spoke with the 
child. 116 Both the judge and the psychiatrist found that the child suffered 
no psychological harm from living with the mother and her homosexual 
companion and that both the mother and father were good parents. 117 
Accordingly, the judge ordered that the parents be awarded joint legal and 
physical custody .118 The father appealed this order.U9 
In appealing the joint custody award, the father first argued that be-
cause there is a conflict between the mother and father, joint custody 
107 /d. at 769-70, 452 N .E.2d at 492. The Supreme Judicial Court then vacated the order of 
the district court, awarding legal custody to the Department and physical custody to the 
caretaker. Id. at 770, 452 N.E.2d at 492. The Court suggested that a proceeding in the 
probate and family court be expedited to resolve the custody dispute. Id. 
108 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983). 
109 Jd. at 500, 452 N.E.2d at 294. 
110 Id. 
111 Jd. At the time of the separation the mother and father worked out a visitation 
agreement whereby the child would spend approximately equal time with each parent. /d. 
112 Jd. at 501-02, 452 N.E.2d at 295. The wife stipulated at the time of trial that she was 
engaged in a homosexual relationship that she intended to continue. Id. 
113 Jd. at 501, 452 N.E.2d at 295. 
11< Id. 
115 Jd. The husband was granted physical custody during the week and the wife was 
granted physical custody two out of every three weekends. I d. The court pointed out that 
this custody arrangement meant that the child lived with his mother while she was engaged 
in the homosexual relationship. ld. 
116 Id. 
117 Jd. The child was almost ten years old at the time of the trial. Id. According to the 
court, both the trial court judge and the guardian ad litem found that the child was a "verbal, 
intelligent young man who knows what he wants and has the ability to articulate the same. 
He would prefer to live with both parents under one roof, but if that is not possible, he would 
like to live with both parents separately." I d. 
u8 Id. 
119 Id. at 501-02, 452 N.E.2d at 2%. 
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would not be in the child's best interests.120 The father further argued that 
since joint custody is against the child's best interest and smce the mother 
~·leads a deviant lifestyle," due to her homosexual relationship, sole 
custody should be awarded to him.121 In addressing the father's first 
argument, the Appeals Court recognized that there was a conflict between 
the parents .122 According to the court, this conflict was irrelevant because 
it only involved the parents' feelings toward one another and not their 
feelings concerning the raising of the child. 123 The court contrasted this 
case with Rolde v. Rolde 124 where the conflict between the parents con-
cerned the proper way to raise the child. In Rolde, the Appeals Court held 
that "in order for joint custody or shared responsibility to work, both 
parents must be able mutually 'to agree on the basic issues in child rearing 
and want to cooperate in making decisions for [their] children.' " 125 In 
Doe, the court stated, because the evidence showed that the mother and 
father shared "mutual desires and concern" over the "child's welfare and 
happiness," Rolde was inapplicable.126 The court, therefore concluded 
that the type of conflict that existed between the parties in this case did 
not render the joint custody award inappropriate.127 
The Doe court then considered the husband's second argument that the 
wife's "deviant lifestyle" compelled the court to award sole custody to 
the husband.128 In considering this argument, the court first noted that a 
120 Jd. 
121 ld. at 502, 452 N.E.2d at 295. The court, prior to addressing these two arguments, 
noted that custody disputes arising out of divorce must be determined in accordance with 
G.L. c. 208, § 31, which provides that the parents' rights to custody are presumed equal, 
absent misconduct, and custody is to be determined on the basis of the happiness and 
welfare of the child. 
122 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 502, 452 N.E.2d at 295. The father, in arguing that the conftict 
between the mother and father precluded an award of joint custody, relied on Rolde v. 
Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 425 N.E.2d 388 (1981). For facts of the case, see infra note 
125. 
123 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 502, 452 N.E.2d at 295. 
124 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 425 N.E.2d 388 (1981). 
125 I d. at 404, 425 N.E.2d at 390. The facts in Rolde are as follows: At the time that the 
parents separated they agreed upon certain custody and visitation rights, whereby the child 
would live with the mother, and the father would have reasonable visitation rights. A 
temporary custody order reiterated this arrangement. The probate court, however, after a 
full trial awarded the mother sole custody and eliminated much of the father's visitation 
rights. The father appealed the award of sole custody.Jd. at 399-400, 425 N.E.2d at 389. 
12 6 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 503, 452 N.E.2d at 296. 
127 Jd. 
128 ld. at 502, 452 N.E.2d at 296. For articles on homosexuality in custody disputes, see 
generally Note, The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody and Parental Rights of 
Homosexual, Mentally Retarded, Mentally Ill and Incarcerated Parents, 16 J. FAM. L. 7fJ7 
(1977-78). See also Campbell, Child Custody: When One Parent is a Homosexual, 17 
JUDGES J. 38 (lfJ78); Hunter & Polikoft', Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers; Legal Theory 
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parent's lifestyle standing alone is an insufficient ground for termination 
of parental custody. 129 The court found support for this proposition in the 
Appeals Court case ofF ort v. Fort .130 In Fort the court held that it is not 
improper to award custody of a minor child to a parent who cohabits 
illegally with a person other than the parent's spouse.131 The Fort court 
stated that the moral or criminal nature of illegal cohabitation is only 
relevant where evidence is presented that demonstrates an adverse effect 
on the child directly attributable to that cohabitation.132 Applying the Fort 
standard to the facts in Doe, the court found that there was no evidence to 
show that the mother's homosexual relationship would adversely affect 
the child.133 The court, in reaching this conclusion, relied both upon the 
testimony of psychiatrists at the trial, and upon the evidence presented to 
support the trialjudge's decision to award joint custody to the parents.134 
The Appeals Court noted that the psychiatrist had testified that the moth-
er's lifestyle would not adversely affect the child if she were awarded 
some form of c1,1stody. 135 According to the court, the father presented no 
".':':~'· 
other evidence to show that the mother's lifestyle would adversely affect 
the child.136 In fact, the evidence demonstrated that the child was very 
comfortable at the mother's home and liked the mother's homosexual 
and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFFALO L. REv. 691 (1976); Comment, Bezio v. Patenaude: 
The "Coming Out" Custody Controvettsy of Lesbian Mothers in Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. 
REV. 331 (1981). 
129 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 503, 452 N.E.2d at 296. (citing Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 
155, 767-70, 452 N.E.2d 483, 489-90 (1983); Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 579, 452 
N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1980)). The court noted that although the cases cited did not involve 
custody proceedings arising out of a divorce, the same principle was applicable. 16 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 503, 452 N .E.2d at 296. 
130 12 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 425 N.E.2d 754 (1981), review denied, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2140. For a discussion of this case, see 1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 3.4, at 81. 
131 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 418-19,425 N.E.2d at 758. The facts in Fort are as follows: Upon 
the parents' separation, the father moved from the marital home and began cohabiting with 
an unmarried woman. Soon after, the father was awarded custody of the child in the divorce 
decree. The mother appealed, contending that the judge's decision to award custody of the 
child to the father was erroneous because the father was not suited to care for the child 
because of this cohabitation. Id. at 412-13, 425 N.E.2d at 755-56. 
132 Id. at 418-19, 425 N.E.2d at 759. 
133 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 503, 452 N.E.2d at 296. 
134 Id. 
135 I d. Four psychiatrists testified at trial. I d. The trial judge said that "three of these 
people were of the opinion that the wife's lifestyle, in and of itself, would not adversely 
affect the minor child, should the wife be awarded some form of custody." Id. The fourth 
psychiatrist found that "mere association between a minor child and a homosexual parent 
was detrimental to the child." I d. at 503 n.2, 452 N.E.2d at 296 n.2. The trial court judge, 
however, did not find this opinion credible because "[the psychiatrist] had no supporting 
studies and his exposure to single parent lesbians was limited." Id. 
138 Id. at 504, 452 N.E.2d at 296. 
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companion. 137 The court also found important in its determination of the 
award of joint custody that the child was not teased by his friends 
concerning his mother's homosexual relationship. 138 In sum, the Appeals 
Court treated the mother's sexual orientation as only one element to be 
considered in the custody decision. The court deemed homosexuality a 
relevant factor only where there is clear proof that the child would be 
appreciably harmed by being placed in the custody of the homosexual 
parent. 
In custody disputes, each case is unique, and thus no rigid set of 
guidelines is ever satisfactory. Nevertheless, in the three cases discussed 
above, the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court articulated the 
standards to be used in three different types of custody disputes. In 
Freeman v. Chap lie / 39 the Supreme Judicial Court established the stan-
dard for use in custody disputes between a third party and the custodian 
selected by the natural mother. The Court formulated a two-prong test 
when it determined that the paternal grandparents, who the mother had 
chosen as custodians rather than the maternal step-grandmother, should 
be appointed guardians with custody .140 Under this test, the first inquiry is 
the determination of the suitability of the present guardians .141 If they are 
found suitable, then the inquiry ends and the child remains with the 
guardians.142 If the guardians are found unsuitable, then the court addres-
ses the second issue: the fitness of the parent.143 If the parent is found fit to 
have custody, then that parent is either granted custody or the court must 
honor his or her selection of a guardian. 144 If the parents are found unfit, 
then the court appoints a guardian.145 
The Freeman court, in formulating this two-prong test, ignored the best 
interest of the child standard. The Court did not consider that the child 
had lived with the maternal step-grandmother almost exclusively for the 
first seven years of her life, and with the paternal grandparents for only 
the two years prior to the custody hearing, or that the child preferred to 
live with the maternal step-grandmother. Instead of considering the 
child's interests, the Court focused on the present guardians and the 
parents. Because the present guardians were found suitable and the 
mother was found fit, the Court reasoned that it was required to honor the 
mother's wishes as to her choice of a guardian. 
137 ld. 
138 ld. 
139 388 Mass. 398,446 N.E.2d 1369(1983). See supra notes 21-58 and accompanying text. 
140 388 Mass. at 404, 446 N.E.2d at 1373. 
141 388 Mass. at 403-04, 446 N.E.2d at 1373. 
142 ld. 
143 Id. at 405-06, 446 N.E.2d at 1373. 
144 Id. at 404-06, 446 N.E.2d at 1373-74. 
145 Id. 
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In Custody of a Minor, 146 the Supreme Judicial Court articulated the 
standard to be used in a custody dispute between a third party and the 
natural mother. Using the parental fitness standard, the Court determined 
that the appeals court judge gave undue weight to the mother's lifestyle. 147 
The Court indicated that the only way a parent could be found unfit is if 
the child would be "seriously endangered" as a result of living with that 
parent.148 The Court, while alluding to the interests of the child, clearly 
used the parental fitness test as the controlling standard. In so doing, the 
Court gave little credence to the lower court's finding that the mother's 
absence from the child for two and one half years caused the child to 
harbor a continuing resentment toward the mother. Thus, it appears that 
in Massachusetts in cases between third parties and natural parents, the 
parents will be given custody absent serious endangerment to the child. 
In Doe v. Doe, the Appeals Court discussed the standard to be used in a 
custody dispute between two natural parents where one parent is a 
homosexual.149 Iri a custody dispute between two natural parents, consid-
eration of the best interests of the child has traditionally predominated 
over the fitness of the parent inquiry .15° Consistent with this tradition, the 
Doe court, unlike the Freeman and Custody of a Minor courts, did not 
abandon the best interest of the child standard in favor of the parental 
fitness standard. Instead, the Doe court gave weight both to evidence of 
the fitness of the homosexual mother and the effect of the mother's 
homosexual relationship on the child. 151 The Doe decision thus indicates 
that, in custody disputes between two natural parents, the best interests 
standard, while no longer the dominant test in Massachusetts, remains 
significant. 
Several important principles emerged from Freeman, Custody of a 
Minor, and Doe regarding the correct application of the parental fitness 
and the best interests of the child tests and the type of evidence needed to 
prove each one. In disputes between a third party and the custodian 
selected by the parent, and disputes between a third party and the natural 
parent, the parental fitness test predominates. In disputes between the 
natural parents, both the parental fitness and the best interest tests are 
significant. The use of the parental fitness test as either the predominant 
test or the significant test in these custody disputes indicates a recognition 
by the courts of parents' rights to custody of their own children. 
146 389 Mass. at 767, 452 N .E.2d at 491. See supra notes 59-107 and accompanying text. 
147 389 Mass. at 769-70, 452 N.E.2d at 492. 
148 Id. at 767, 452 N.E.2d at 491. 
149 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 503,452 N.E.2d at 296. See supra notes 108-138 and accompany-
ing text. 
130 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
131 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 503-04, 452 N.E.2d at 296. 
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Consistent with this recognition, these cases demonstrate that the trial 
court judge's determination of custody may no longer be based on the 
court's bias or prejudice but rather must be based on objective factors. 
The petitioner must be able to provide concrete factual proof that the 
parent's behavior will adversely affect the child. 152 By requiring that the 
trial court judge's determination of custody be based solely on objective 
factors, the courts have circumscribed a trial judge's broad discretionary 
power in custody proceedings. In so doing, these courts have recognized 
that the important fundamental rights of parents demand high standards 
when parents are to be denied custody of their children. 
§ 16.4. Divorce - Equitable Distribution of Property - Pension Be-
nefits.* If the parties in a divorce action do not reach a property settle-
ment, section 34 of chapter 208 of the General Laws grants the trial court 
the authority to fashion an equitable division of the marital property in 
addition to, or in lieu of, awarding alimony to either spouse.1 During the 
Survey year, the Appeals Court rendered three decisions that will affect 
the equitable distribution of property under section 34. In Bennett v. 
Bennett2 and Shes key v. Sheskey ,3 the court addressed the significance of 
tax consequences produced by an equitable distribution of property. In 
Dewan v. Dewan, 4 the court addressed some of the valuation and distribu-
tion problems created by the equitable distribution of pension benefits 
152 Freeman v. Chaplic, 388 Mass. 398, 4()4.05, 446 N.E.2d 1369, 1373-74 (1983); Custody 
of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 767-68, 452 N.E.2d 483, 490-91 (1983); Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 
503-04, 452 N.E.2d at 296. 
* Geoffrey Hobart, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 16.4. 1 G.L. c. 208, § 34 provides in pertinent part: 
Upon divorce or upon a complaint in an action brought at any time after a divorce, 
whether such a divorce has been adjudged in this commonwealth or another jurisdic-
tion, the court of the commonwealth, provided there is personal jurisdiction over both 
parties, may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other. In 
addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court may assign to either 
husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. In determining the amount of 
alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to 
be so assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall 
consider the length of marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the 
age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, 
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity 
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also 
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisiton, preservation or 
appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the 
parties as a homemaker to the family unit. 
2 15 Mass. App. Ct. 999, 448 N.E.2d 77 (1983) 
3 16 Mass. App. Ct. 159, 450 N.E.2d 187 (1983). 
4 17 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 455 N.E.2d 1236 (1983). 
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under section 34. This chapter will consider separately the issues raised in 
these cases, beginning with the court's treatment of tax consequences in 
Bennett and Shes key. 
The Appeals Court in Bennett and Sheskey outlined the manner in 
which tax issues should be handled in distribution of property cases. Prior 
to the Bennett and Sheskey decisions, the Supreme Judicial Court in Rice 
v. Rice 5 stated that a judge's order could not be considered "plainly 
wrong" because of a failure to consider the tax consequences involved in 
a property distribution if the appellant spouse did not present evidence at 
trial concerning ~uch issues. 6 The Bennett court applied the principle 
expressed in Rice. 8 
In Bennett, the Appeals Court reviewed a property award in a divorce 
action.9 The probate judge granted Mrs. Bennett a divorce and awarded 
her alimony, child support, a provision for the educational expenses 'or the 
children of the marriage, and a division of property .10 At the time of the 
trial, Dr. Bennett was employed as an orthodontist by a professional 
corporation of which he was the sole stockholder .11 During the proceed-
ings, Mrs. Bennett presented a certified public accountant as a witness. 12 
The accountant testified about various tax and valuation issues concern-
ing Dr. Bennett's professional corporation, distributions and loans re-
ceived by Dr. Bennett from his corporation, Dr. Bennett's pension and 
profit sharing plan, and his interests in certain commercial properties.13 
Although Dr. Bennett's attorney cross-examined the accountant, he did 
not present any evidence relevant to tax and valuation issues as part of 
Dr. Bennett's case in chiefY On appeal, Dr. Bennett challenged the 
property award on the ground that the probate judge had failed to consider 
the tax effects accruing to Dr. Bennett as a result of the property award. 15 
The Appeals Court upheld the probate judge's property award, stating 
that under the circumstances it could not hold that the probate judge's 
findings were clearly erroneous. 16 The court found that Dr. Bennett had 
• 372 Mass. 398, 361 N.E.2d 1305 (1977). 
6 /d. at 402 n.4, 361 N.E.2d at 1308. For an analysis of the Rice decision, see Inker, 
Perocchi and Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 1.2 at ll-13. The 
Appeals Court followed the Supreme Judicial Court's language in Rice in two subsequent 
decisions. See Angelone v. Angelone, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 732, 404 N.E.2d 672, 674 
(1980); 9 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 870, 401 N.E.2d 163, 164 (1980). 
8 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
9 /d. at 999-1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
10 /d. at 999, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. at 999-1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
14 /d. at 1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
15 See id. at 999, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
1s Jd. The Appeals Court cited Rice, Angelone, and Langerman in support of its ruling. 15 
Mass. App. Ct. at 1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
33
Chardak et al.: Chapter 16: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
514 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 16.4 
failed to present evidence at trial relevant to the tax issues in the case and 
had not requested consideration of such issues.18 As a result, the court 
stated that it could not find that the probate judge had failed to consider 
the criteria set out in section 34.19 
The court noted, however, that Dr. Bennett was not without recourse. 
Dr. Bennett, the court stated, could seek review of the alimony and 
support awards on the grounds of changed circumstances.20 According to 
the court, Dr. Bennett could also challenge the alimony and support 
awards in the context of contempt proceedings if he was unable to make 
these payments because of the unexpected tax liability created by the 
property distribution.21 The court concluded by cautioning attorneys that 
tax consequences are likely to be of great importance in property distribu-
tion cases involving sophisticated profit sharing and estate planning ar-
rangements. 22 
In Shes key, the Appeals Court further explicated the appropriate judi-
cial treatment of the tax issues involved in property distribution cases.23 
At the time of the trial, Dr. Sheskey was employed as an anesthesiologist 
at Brigham and Women's Hospitai.24 Before becoming affiliated with the 
hospital, Dr. Sheskey had been employed by Pilgrim Anesthesia Services, 
Inc. ("Pilgrim"), of which he was the sole director and shareholder.25 
When Dr. Sheskey joined Brigham and Women's Hospital, Pilgrim be-
came inactive but was not dissolved.26 For the purposes of Pilgrim's 
pension plan, Dr. Sheskey still retained his status as a Pilgrim employee.27 
At trial, the probate judge valued Dr. Sheskey's interest in this plan at 
$240,000 and included this amount in the marital assets to be distributed.28 
Dr. Sheskey's attorney requested that the judge consider the adverse 
tax consequences involved in the premature withdrawal of funds from the 
Pilgrim pension plan.29 The attorney presented affidavits and expert tes-
18 Jd. On appeal, Dr. Bennett's attorney conceded that absent a request that he do so and 
absent sufficient evidence, the probate judge was under no obligation to consider tax issues 
in making the property distribution in question. Jd. 
19 I d. In Bianco v. Bianco, the Supreme Judicial Court held that because section 34 grants 
the courts such broad discretion in fashioning a settlement in divorce cases, the record must 
clearly indicate that the trial judge considered all the factors set out in section 34. 371 Mass. 
420, 423, 358 N.E.2d 243, 245 (1976). For an analysis of the Bianco decision see Inker, 
Perocchi and Walsh, Domestic Relations, 1977 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 1.2, at 7-9. 
20 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
21 ld. 
22 Jd. 
23 16 Mass. App. Ct. 159, 159-62, 450 N.E.2d 187, 187-89 (1983). 





29 Id. at 159, 450 N.E.2d at 187. 
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timony concerning the tax issues relevant to this matter.30 Despite coun-
sel's request and the evidence presented on behalf of Dr. Sheskey, the 
probate judge did not consider the tax issues involved in the case when 
making the property distribution. 31 
On appeal, the Appeals Court held that the probate judge's failure to 
consider the adverse tax impact on Dr. Sheskey in making the property 
distribution was reversible error.32 The court distinguished Bennett with 
respect to the way the tax issues were dealt with at triaP3 The Sheskey 
court found that Dr. Sheskey's attorney had made a timely request that 
the judge consider the tax consequences involved in the case and had 
presented sufficient evidence relevant to the issue.34 Because the record 
did not show that the probate judge had considered the tax consequences 
involved in making the property distribution, the court remanded the case 
for reconsideration of the property award in light of the adverse tax 
consequences to Dr. Shes key. 35 
While the Bennett and Sheskey decisions dealt with the tax issues 
involved in the distribution of pension rights, the issue in Dewan was the 
valuation of pension benefits. Specifically, the Dewan court addressed the 
problem of how to value and distribute a spouse's interest in a federal 
employee's civil service retirement plan.37 The trial judge valued Mr. 
Dewan's interest in the pension plan according to the amount of his actual 
contributions to the plan.38 Mrs. Dewan contended that her husband's 
pension rights should be valued at their present value. 39 In support of her 
position, Mrs. Dewan presented an actuary as an expert witness. 40 Ac-
cording to the actuary, if Mr. Dewan retired in six years after accumulat-
ing 30 years of service, the present value of his retirement benefits would 
30 Id. at 162, 450 N.E.2d at 188. The expert produced by Dr. Sheskey estimated that a 
withdrawal of$159,173 from the Pilgrim pension fund in 1980 would result in a tax increase 
to Dr. Sheskey of $104,100. ld. 
3' Id. at 162, 450 N.E.2d at 188-89. 
82 ld. 
33 Id. at 159, 450 N.E.2d at 187. 
34 See id. at 159-61, 450 N.E.2d at 187-88. 
35 Id. at 162, 450 N.E.2d at 188-89. The Appeals Court instructed the probate judge to 
restructure the property settlement "with a view to minimizing the unnecessary adverse 
income tax consequences." Id. at 162, 450 N.E.2d at 189. The court offered suggestions as 
to how the adverse tax impact on Dr. Sheskey could be avoided./d. In particular the court 
suggested that Dr. Sbeskey could pay enhanced periodic alimony payments in lieu of the 
previously ordered lump sum payment. I d. Interestingly, the court did not suggest that the 
pension benefits be divided according to a set percentage when received by Dr. Sheskey 
upon retirement. 
37 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237. 
38 Id. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237. 
39 Id. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237-38. 
40 Id. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237. 
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be $175,803.41 The actuary also testified that if Mr. Dewan retired imme-
diately, the present value of his future pension benefits would be 
$275,383.42 The trial judge rejected this testimony and valued Mr. De-
wan's interest in the plan at $34,843.44, the amount of Mr. Dewan's actual 
contributions to the plan.43 Dissatisfied with the judge's determination, 
Mrs. Dewan appealed this part of the decision.44 
The Appeals Court held that it was clearly erroneous for the trial judge 
to value the husband's interest in his pension plan according to his 
accumulated contributions to the plan.45 The court reasoned that this 
valuation technique was incorrect because the actuarial benefit of a pen-
sion generally far exceeds the amount of an employee's accumulated 
contributions.46 According to the court, the husband's accumulated con-
tributions would be depleted after approximately two years of retirement 
if they were the sole source of his pension benefits.47 The Appeals Court, 
however, was unwilling to accept the present value calculations offered 
by Mrs. Dewan, 48 finding the evidence presented insufficient to establish 
their applicability to the facts in the case before it.49 The court noted, for 
example, that the actuary's calculation of $275,383 was based on the 
assumption that Mr. Dewan would retire immediately.50 The record did 
not show, however, that Mr. Dewan could retire immediately without 
41 Jd. 
42 Although the husband's pension would be higher after 30 years of service, the time 
delay in the receipt of the benefits and the expectation of fewer payments upon retirement 
account for the difference in the two calculations. Jd. at 97 n.1, 455 N.E.2d at 1237 n.l. 
43 Jd. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237-38. 
44 Jd. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237. 
40 Id. at 100, 455 N.E.2d at 1239, The court noted, however, that the accumulated 
contributions technique could be the appropriate way to value pension benefits, if the 
pension rights were vested and there was ev.dence showing that the employee-spouse was 
likely to shift employment and withdraw the accumulated contributions. I d. at 100 n.8, 455 
N.E.2d at 1239 n.8. 
46 I d. at 100,455 N.E.2d at 1239. The court cited cases from community property states in 
support of its position. I d. See Phillipson v. Board of Admin., Pub. Employees' Retirement 
Sys., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 49, 473 P.2d 765, 776, 89 Cal. Rptr. (i1, 72(1970) (the community property 
of a marriage includes not only the employee spouse's contributions to the plan, but also the 
matured pension rights payable as a benefit of employment), disapproved sub nom., In re 
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, .544 P.2d 561, 569 n.14, t26 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 
n.14 (1976); Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 414, 575 P.2d 99, 104 (197.5)(ordering the 
trial court to make a determination of the present value of the unmat1,1red pension benefits 
and equitably divide the pension on a "pay as it comes in" system); In re Maniage of 
Minnis, 54 Or. App. 70, 75-76,634 P.2d 259, 262(1981) (the trial court's valuation of pension 
rights as the amount of the husband's contributions was emmeous). 
47 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 99-100, 455 N.E.2d at 1239. 
48 Jd. at 99, 455 N.E.2d at 1238. 
49 Jd. 
50 Jd. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237. 
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forfeiting his pension rights.51 In addition, the court noted, the $175,803 
figure was based on the assumption that Mr. Dewan would be willing to 
retire after 30 years service.52 Yet, according to the court, the record 
failed to indicate that Mr. Dewan was in fact willing to retire after 30 years 
of service. 53 
Even in circumstances where the assumptions underlying a present 
value calculation could be substantiated, the court observed that the 
distribution of the present value of a spouse's pension rights often would 
be unrealistic.55 According'to the court, the assignment of the present 
value of pension b~mefits is problem~tic because the present value of 
future pensi~n benefits is not a liquid asset. 56 If the present value of 
pension benefits is included in the marital property to be distributed at the 
time of the judgment, the court noted, there may not be sufficient liquid 
assets to carry out the property settlement. 57 In order to alleviate this 
problem, the court held that pension rights could be distributed. "if, as, 
and when" the retiring spouse receives the benefits.58 
The manner in which pension rights should be distributed, the court 
stated, may depend on the age of the parties and the length of the 
marriage. The court observed that in situations where the spouses are far 
from retirement age and where the marriage is of short duration, assign. 
ment of the present value of pension rights at the time of the divorce may 
be feasible because of the low present value of the benefits and the low 
percentage to which the nonretiring spouse would be entitled. 59 On the 
other hand, in situations where the marriage is of longer duration and 
where retirement age is more proximate, the trial court might retain 
jurisdiction and distribute the benefits if and when received by the retiring 
spouse.60 The court noted that in the latter situations structuring the 
51 Id. at 99 n.6, 455 N.E.2d at 1238. 
52 Id. at 97, 455 N.E.2d at 1237. 
53 Id. at 99, 455 N.E.2d at 1238-39. 
55 /d. at 100, 455 N.E.2d at 1239. 
56 Id, 
57 /d. 
58 /d. The cpurt stated that in instances where the division is made to apply to pension 
benefits when received, the applicable percentage is typically a portion of the pension 
benefit$ attributable to the period of the marriage. /d. at 101, 455 N.E.2d at 1239-40. 
According to the court, the appropriate percentage is generally a fraction, the numerator of 
which is the time period during the marriage in which the benefits were accrued, the 
denominator of which is the total period of accrual. /d. at 101, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. 
59 /d. at 102, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. The court noted that in such cases it may not be 
inappropriate for a judge to value pension rights by any accumulated contributions which are 
refundable upon the employee-spouse's voluntary termination of employment. /d. at 102 
n.9, 455 N.E.2d at 1240 n.9. 
60 See id. at 102, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. The court left open the possibility that if other 
significant assets existed, the distribution of the present value of a spouse's pension rights 
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division of pension benefits according to a percentage of future retirement 
receipts would alleviate a number of potential problems caused by the 
distribution of the value of pension rights at the time of the trial. 62 The 
court pointed out that valuing pension benefits at the time of the divorce is 
often exceedingly difficult due to various contingencies surrounding the 
vesting and maturation of pension rights.63 Consequently, according to 
the court, the distribution of pension rights at the time of the trial may be 
unfair because one spouse then bears the risk that those rights might be 
destroyed by death or by termination of employment prior to matura-
tion.64 Distributing pension benefits as received, the court observed, 
makes it unnecessary to calculate the present value of a spouse's pension 
benefits65 and allocates equally the risk that the pension will fail to vest.66 
Furthermore, the court stated, when the present value of a spouse's 
pension rights is large, the division of those rights at the time of divorce 
simply may not be feasible in the absence of other significant assets.67 
Concluding that the appropriate method of dealing with pension rights 
must be determined by the circumstances of the particular case, the court 
remanded the case to the lower court for an appropriate determination.68 
The Appeals Court's decisions in Bennett, Shes key, and Dewan sig-
nificantly affect the valuation of pension benefits and the consideration of 
tax consequences in property distributions under chapter 208, section 34 
of the General Laws. In Bennett and Sheskey, the court concluded that a 
trial judge is under no obligation to consider the tax consequences in-
might be appropriate. See id. For example, if the property to be distributed under section 34 
included a home, the non-working spouse could receive the home and the employee-spouse 
could retain the rights to the future pension benefits. The problem remains, however, that 
the employee-spouse may never receive those benefits because of premature termination of 
employment or death. 
62 Id. at 101, 455 N.E.2d at 1239. The court quoted a passage from In re Marriage of 
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639, 544 P.2d 561, 567 (1976), which 
described the advantages of distributing non vested pension rights according to a percentage 
of the benefits as received. Jd. 
63 See id. at 102, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. An employee's interest in a pension plan is vested 
when the minimum term of employment necessary to receive retirement benefits has been 
completed. L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 168 (1983). An interest in 
a pension plan has matured when the employee-spouse has an unconditional right to 
immediate receipt of the retirement benefits. ld. It is possible for an interest to be vested but 
not matured. Jd. 
64 See 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 102, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. 
65 !d. at 101, 455 N .E.2d at 1239 (quoting In reMarriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 
P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1976)). 
66 ld. (quoting Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639, 544 P.2d at 567). 
67 Jd. at 102, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. 
68 Jd. 
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volved in a property distribution case unless the issue is properly raised.69 
The Sheskey case clarifies the manner in which a tax issue can be raised, 
explains the obligations of the trial judge once a tax issue has been so 
presented/0 and indicates that, once raised, the record must reflect con-
sideration of tax consequences. 71 
The Bennett and Sheskey decisions are consistent with other Massa-
chusetts cases in finding that trial judges are not required to consider tax 
consequences in property distribution cases if the issues have not been 
properly raised. 72 The failure of the Massachusetts courts to treat tax 
consequences as a mandatory factor for consideration in property dis-
tribution cases, however, can lead to inequitable results.73 The Bennett 
case illustrates the consequences that can result from not addressing the 
tax issue at the property distribution trial. While the Bennett court recog-
nized that the probate judge's decision would probably result in Dr. 
Bennett incurring significant tax liabilities, the court refused to set aside 
the probate judge's findings because the tax issue had not been properly 
raised at triaP4 The Appeals Court held that to obtain recourse, Dr. 
Bennett would have to either petition for a hearing on grounds of changed 
circumstances or withhold payment and pursue the matter in a contempt 
proceeding. 75 Neither alternative is satisfactory. To promote judicial 
efficiency and ensure fair results in property distribution cases, trial 
judges should be required to consider the tax consequences of a property 
distribution whether or not the issue is raised by the parties. 
Because current Massachusetts law does not require judicial considera-
tion of tax issues in property distribution cases, counsel should be particu-
larly careful to research thoroughly the tax ramifications of a proposed 
property distribution.76 If a case does involve tax implications, the tax 
issue should be raised in the manner approved by the Shes key court. 77 By 
properly raising the tax issues at trial, the client's interests are protected 
89 See Bennett, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 1000, 448 N.E.2d at 78; Sheskey, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 159, 162, 450 N.E.2d at 187, 188-89. 
70 See 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 159, 162, 450 N.E.2d at 187, 188-89. 
71 See id. at 162, 450 N.E.2d at 188-89. 
72 See Rice, 372 Mass. at 402 n.4, 361 N.E.2d at 1308 n.4; Angelone, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 
732, 404 N.E.2d at 674; Langerman, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 870, 401 N.E.2d at 164. 
73 See Freedman & Musko, General Laws 208, Section 34 and the Internal Revenue 
Code, 24 BOSTON B.J. (No. 2) 15, 18 (1980). 
74 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 999, 448 N.E.2d at 78. 
75 ld. 
78 For a good discussion of some of the tax problems involved in divorce cases, see 
Freedman & Musko,supra note 73, at 15-17, and Domestic Relations Tax Problems, 36TAX 
LAWYER 977 (1983). 
77 Freedman & Musko maintain counsel has the duty and obligation to request the trial 
court to take judicial notice of the tax issues involved in a property settlement case. 
Freedman & Musko, supra note 73, at 16. 
39
Chardak et al.: Chapter 16: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
520 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 16.4 
because, under Shes key, the trial court is then required to address those 
tax issues in the assignment of property. 78 
The Appeals Court's decision in Dewan will significantly affect the way 
pension benefits are treated under section 34. The question of how to 
value pension benefits for the purposes of a section 34 property distribu-
tion had not been raised before in Massachusetts. In the Dewan case, the 
court severely limited the use of the accumulated contributions valuation 
method, favoring instead apportioned distribution of pension benefits "if, 
as, and when" the benefits are received. 79 
Mter Dewan, the trial courts will have the discretion to use the method 
most appropriate to the circumstances of a given case.80 When the mar-
riage is of short duration and the spouses are far from retirement age, 
division of the pension benefits at the time of the divorce may be war-
ranted.81 With an immediate distribution, the pension rights may be val-
ued according to the amount of accumulated contributions refundable on 
voluntary termination of employment. 82 In cases where the marriage is of 
longer duration and the employee-spouse is closer to retirement age, two 
factors in particular should guide the treatment of pension benefits. First, 
the court should look to see what other marital assets are to be distrib-
uted.83 Second, it should determine whether the pension rights are vested 
or matured.84 
If the employee-spouse's benefits are either unvested85 or unmatured, 
counsel representing the employee-spouse should argue for the applica-
tion of the "if, as, and when received" method of distribution, even if 
other significant assets are available to offset the present value of the 
client's pension rights. The "if, as, and when received" method allocates 
the risk that the pension benefits will in fact be realized equally between 
the parties.86 This method of distribution requires that courts retain juris-
diction to achieve fair results in cases where the present assignment of 
78 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 162, 450 N.E.2d at 188-89. 
79 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 99-100, 455 N.E.2d at 1238-39. 
80 /d. at 101-02, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. 
81 Id. at 102, 455 N.E.2d at 1240. 
82 Id. at 102 n.9, 455 N.E.2d at 1240 n.9. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 Golden maintains that if pensions are viewed as a form of deferred compensation, it 
should be irrelevant whether or not the pension benefits have vested. L. GoLDEN, supra 
note 63, at 171. Golden observes, however, that a major controversy in the pension area 
concerns whether nonvested pension rights fit within the concept of property acquired 
during the marriage. !d. 
86 See In reMarriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,848,544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 
639 (1976). 
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pension benefits places an unfair risk on the party who must wait for the 
receipt of the pension benefits. 87 
87 The reserved jurisdiction method may be desirable in all cases where the parties fail to 
reach a property settlement. The present distribution of the value of pension rights may be 
inherently unfair because the nonemployee spouse enjoys the benefits of a share of this value 
from the date of the distribution. See L. Golden, supra note 63, at 177. The employee-
spouse, on the other hand, must Wait until retirement, which might not occur, to realize his 
or her share of the property assignment. Id. 
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